[...] Stanley Cavell is one of the great minds of our time, but he is not a founder of movements or a coiner of slogans or a trader of "isms" [...] [He is] a writer who always speaks to individuals--and that means, one at a time [...]. To read Cavell as he should be read is to enter into a conversation with him, one in which your entire sensibility and his are involved, and not only your mind and his mind. (p. 119)Essa última passagem é tão espetacular que vale a pena até traduzir um trechinho, para que buscas por "filosofia da linguagem ordinária" e "vomitar" tenham chance de cair aqui :). Segue, então, minha "traducão livre"
Cavell (and Wittgenstein as Cavell reads him) are concerned to make us see something that troubles the skeptic, something that can and should give us a sense of "vertigo" at certain times, without causing us either to become skeptics or to find illusory comfort in over-intellectualized response. (p. 121)
Othello is, in a sense, a genuine skeptic about one other mind--Desdemona's. His problem--and this is the horror of his situation--isn't that he lacks "evidence" of Desdemona's faithfulness. It is that no evidence is good enough. And even to imagine one of the minor ordinary-language philosophers of the 1950s and 1960s saying to Othello "This is what we call conclusive evidence of Desdemona's faithfulness" (or: "This is what we having an unreasonable doubt") makes one want to vomit. That is why The Claim of Reason may be described as a defense of Wittgenstein against "ordinary-language philosophy", not a defense of Wittgenstein as an ordinary-language philosopher. (pp. 126-127)
A simples tentativa de imaginar um filósofo da linguagem ordinária menor dos anos 1950 e 1960 dizendo a Othello "Isso é o que chamamos evidência conclusiva para a fidelidade de Desdemona" [...] já nos faz querer vomitar.